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Abstract
A century ago, Thorstein Veblen introduced socially contingent con-
sumption into the economic literature. This paper complements the scarce
empirical literature by testing his conjecture on South African household
data and finds that Black and Coloured households spend relatively more
on visible consumption than comparable White households. In an emerg-
ing economy context, this is especially important as it carries implications
for spending on future assets. This paper explores whether the differences
in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status
seeking. Among Black households, spending on visible consumption is
found to change predictably with different reference group incomes.
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1 Introduction
It is usually observed that expenditure patterns differ across as well as within
countries. A large body of theoretical and empirical contributions to demand
theory explains these differences in terms of variation in relative prices and in-
come (see, e.g., Blundell (1988) for a survey and Selvanathan and Selvanathan
(1993, 2004) for more empirical applications). An important assumption of this
approach holds that the utility functions, and thus the underlying preferences,
are similar. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence shows that even at a given point in
time and within the same country, some groups seem to spend more on certain
types of goods. In a recent study Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) ex-
plore such a particularity as they empirically access the differences in spending
on conspicuous consumption across races. They study U.S. household spend-
ing on “visible consumption” using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES)
database, an ongoing rotating panel data set, for the period 1986 to 2002. Vis-
ible consumption is defined in terms of consumption items “that are readily
observable in anonymous social interactions, and that are portable across those
interactions” (ibid p. 426). Moreover, consuming more of these goods should
signal “better economic circumstances” (ibid p. 431). In line with anecdotal
evidence, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) find a significant difference in
spending patterns across races. After controlling for differences in permanent
income and demographics, Blacks and Hispanics spend about 30 percent more
on visible consumption than Whites.1 As visible consumption belongs to the
realm of conspicuous consumption, it is straightforward to assume that the dif-
ference in spending is (at least to some extent) explained by social interactions
with one’s reference group. Accordingly, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009)
use a signaling model of status seeking to explain the observed phenomenon.
Using this approach, the authors show that the statistically significant differ-
ence in visible consumption vanishes after they control for mean reference group
income. The results suggest that the initially found differences can be explained
by differences in the social environment. To be consistent with the assumption
of similar utility functions, these findings should hold not only across but also
within social groups. Even for each race separately, the two hypotheses can be
confirmed for the case of the U.S.
In light of the above, it would be especially useful to extend the analysis
by Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) to less aﬄuent countries for at least
two reasons. First, if individuals spend relatively more on visible consumption,
(sooner or later) they will have to spend relatively less on other consumption
categories. This will be particularly relevant if individuals among comparably
less aﬄuent groups spend more on visible consumption, because it might bear
implications for their capacity to catch up to higher income levels. Charles,
Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) show that on average Black and Hispanic house-
holds seem to spend less on education, health, and food. Accordingly, if spending
on visible consumption crowds out spending on future assets among households
with less aﬄuent reference groups in a high income country like the U.S., a
similar finding in a less aﬄuent country might carry implications for our under-
standing of poverty. Second, testing the predictions of the signaling model of
status seeking in a less aﬄuent and economically more unequal country offers
1The households are referred to as Black, Hispanic, Coloured, or White if the head of the
household has reported one of these categories as her social affiliation.
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a more challenging environment for the underlying assumption of similar util-
ity functions across different social groups. As South Africa consists of social
groups with different cultural backgrounds, showing different income distribu-
tions across groups and high inequality within groups, this country appears to
be exceptionally suited as a field of study.
This paper first assesses differences in spending on visible consumption across
social groups in South Africa. Indeed, Coloured and Black households, whose
mean income is much less than that of White households, are found to spend on
average about 35 to 50 percent more on visible consumption than comparable
White households. It is furthermore tested whether the differences in spending
on visible consumption can be explained by a model that incorporates socially
contingent concerns for status. In line with the predictions of the signaling
model of status seeking, the reference group’s mean income (as a proxy for so-
cial environment) is found to account for the difference in visible expenditures.
However, it is concluded that socially contingent differential spending on visi-
ble consumption cannot be confirmed for each group separately. The different
results for the South African subpopulations point to the fact that different
groups may develop different ways to express their relative position within a so-
ciety. Second, the paper assesses whether the importance of positional concerns
changes with income. With rising income, a higher share of visible consumption
expenditures is found to be socially contingent among the Black population.
Overall, the paper contributes additional evidence for the existence of socially
contingent consumption behavior as described by Veblen (1899). To the au-
thor’s knowledge, this is the first paper that shows the validity of this behavior
and assesses the extent of social contingency using consumer expenditure data
in a less aﬄuent country context.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the related literature on conspicuous consumption and outlines the signaling
model of status seeking as well as its predictions. Section 2 introduces the
data set and definitions used in the paper. In section 3, the between group
differences in visible expenditures are assessed and the suitability of the signaling
status model in explaining the between group differences as a socially contingent
phenomenon is tested. The fourth and last section summarizes the results and
concludes.
2 Related Literature and Model Predictions
Veblen (1899) was one of the first economists to systematically introduce status
considerations into economic theory. Fundamental to his “Theory of the leisure
class” is the assumption that individuals compare each other on the basis of their
economic achievements. Moreover, he emphasized that these interpersonal com-
parisons are important for human behavior as they constitute the individual’s
recognition by others. As, according to Veblen (1899, p. 24f.), esteem by fellow
human beings is the basis for self-respect, missing recognition by them would
lower the individual’s self-assessment. To satisfy the need for self-respect, indi-
viduals aim to have at least as much as their own reference group. To be noticed
2This is not to disregard earlier works on certain facets of conspicuous consumption. See,
e.g., Bloch, Rao, and Desai (2004) regarding spending on wedding celebrations as a means to
signal status in rural India.
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by others and to satisfy the desire for social recognition, individuals show their
wealth to others. As wealth is usually unobserved, Veblen (1899) identifies two
different ways to demonstrate one’s position in society. One variant is conspicu-
ous leisure such as demonstratively engaging in everything but productive work.
The second variant investigated here is conspicuous consumption, where visi-
ble consumption of certain goods, signaling a higher position in interpersonal
exchanges, is used to demonstrate one’s status.
The type of behavior sketched so far may give rise to certain dynamics within
a society. If individuals from lower income groups aspire to the living standard
of higher income groups, the demand for the relevant goods increases. Higher
income groups, however, have an incentive to distinguish themselves from lower
income groups and thus direct their expenditures to more visible goods. Fur-
thermore, Veblen (1899) infers that conspicuous consumption is even more im-
portant as social cohesion decreases and mobility rises. The more anonymous
and the more frequent individuals interactions with others are, the more conspic-
uous consumption matters as a means to signal one’s relative position. In more
narrow economic terms, conspicuous consumption can be framed as an economic
externality. A broad range of economic works have focused on economic impli-
cations and possible policy recommendations with regard to such an externality
(see, e.g., Duesenberry 1949, Frank 1985, Bagwell and Bernheim 1996, Glazer
and Konrad 1996, Cowan, Cowan, and Swann 1997).3
While Veblens work was rich in illustrating manifold facets of status-seeking
behavior, the present paper takes a more narrow approach to positional concerns
by investigating spending on highly visible goods suited to signal one’s usually
unobserved wealth. The basic idea has been elaborated in different signaling
status models (Ireland 1994, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1995, Glazer and
Konrad 1996, Corneo and Jeanne 1998, to mention a few). In accordance with
such models, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) derive a simple signaling
framework for empirically investigating visible consumption. In their model, in-
dividuals belong to certain reference groups whose income distribution is known.
Individually unobserved income is spent on an observable and an unobservable
good. Utility is derived from spending on both kinds of goods as well as status,
which is society’s inference about an individual’s income. Status is defined as
the expected value of an individual’s income given her observable spending on
conspicuous consumption and the group she belongs to. Under the assumption
that individuals maximize utility with respect to their budget constraint and
society’s beliefs about an individual’s income, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov
(2009) derive the following predictions:
• Spending on conspicuous consumption increases with own income.
• If average group income rises, spending on conspicuous consumption de-
creases.
For the present analysis the second prediction is particularly relevant as it incor-
porates the group’s income distribution as a socially contingent factor, explain-
ing the level of visible consumption. The intuition behind the second prediction
can be formulated as follows. Among comparable households, those living in a
more aﬄuent environment have a relatively less favorable position within their
3The importance of relative status has also been demonstrated in the context of subjective
well-being; see, e.g., Dynan and Ravina (2007).
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reference group. They should therefore spend relatively less on visible consump-
tion.
If this conjecture is correct, it should be possible to show that any particu-
larities in visible consumption across social groups vanish, or at least diminish,
when the reference group’s average income is controlled for. Moreover, as the
underlying signaling model of status seeking assumes the similarity of utility
functions across groups, differential spending patterns on visible consumption
should be observed within and across social groups.
3 Data and Definitions
The data used in this paper have been collected by Statistics South Africa
(StatsSA). In the years 1995, 2000, and 2005, an income and expenditure sur-
vey (IES) was conducted. It contains information on sources of incomes as well
as on the purchase of a wide variety of goods and services (Orkin 1997). De-
signed to cover a representative sample of South African households, the sample
size consists of 29,582 households in 1995, 26,263 in 2000, and 21,144 in 2005,
respectively.
Working with the data raises two problems. First, the structure of the IES
2005 series differs from preceding surveys (Yu 2008). Second, it has occasionally
been questioned whether the IES of 2000 meets a fully representative standard
(see, e.g., Burger, van der Berg, and Nieftagodien 2004, van der Berg, Louw,
and Yu 2008). Regarding the first problem, the classification of expenditure
items was changed from the Standard Trade Classification to the UN Statis-
tics Division’s Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose
(COICOP) in 2005. Moreover, the data collection methodology changed from
recall to diary method. Besides these differences, imputed rent has been in-
troduced as a new item. To account for these changes, some adjustments are
necessary.4 The second problem concerns mainly procedural weaknesses of the
2000 IES sample. Due to migration between the 1996 census and the collection
of IES data for 2000, the survey is known to overrepresent the Black population
while underrepresenting the White population (O¨zler 2007).5
The summary statistics in Table 1 clearly show the huge differences in in-
come and total expenditures across subgroups. On average, Black households
4The income and expenditure items compiled in 1995 and 2000 were recategorized accord-
ing to the COICOP structure. Furthermore, the 2005 values of income, housing & utilities
as well as total expenditures have to be corrected for the value of imputed rent to be com-
parable to prior IES series. Although the change of methods from recall to diary method
may also diminish comparability, von Fintel (2007) finds no systematic change in estimating
income elasticities of aggregated product categories that can be attributed to the change in
methodology.
5Additionally, a higher share of zero values in food expenditures as well as greater differ-
ences between total income and total expenditures have been found. In accordance with a
suggestion by O¨zler (2007), the 2000 sample was reweighted to match up with the population
shares in the 2001 census. Burger, van der Berg, and Nieftagodien (2004) use different meth-
ods to correct for the observed IES 2000 deficiencies. Their results show surprising robustness
in parameter estimates, especially for more aggregated and less frequently purchased product
categories. The adjustments made and the results by Burger, van der Berg, and Nieftago-
dien (2004) have encouraged the author to cautiously analyze the pooled data. To check the
robustness of the results, all regressions in the paper were rerun without the IES 2000 data.
Although the magnitude of some coefficients changed slightly, none of the results rely on the
inclusion of the IES 2000 data.
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Table 1: Summary Sample Statistics
Black Coloured White Full
Education < 12 years 0.84 0.82 0.27 0.75
Completed secondary school 0.15 0.16 0.54 0.21
Education: degree 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.04
Total expenditures 23,951 41,005 121,913 40,369
Total income 31,701 56,991 183,965 56,584
Age 46.2 46.1 47.6 46.4
Household size 4.2 4.3 2.8 4
Sample size 54,164 8,916 9,083 72,163
Notes: The data consists of all three Income and Expenditure Surveys
(IES) conducted by StatsSA. The sample includes households with house-
hold heads aged between 18 and 100 years. Due to limited sample size,
Asians, Indians, and other minorities have been excluded. Moreover, the
sample is restricted to the 99th percentile of the total expenditure distri-
bution of each subgroup within each year. Two percent of the sample are
omitted due to missing values in the education variable. All amounts are
given in 2005 South African Rand. The figures denote survey weighted
mean values.
in the sample have only slightly more than half of the overall population’s
average income, which approximately corresponds to the average income of
Coloured households. However, the mean income of White households is more
than three times higher than the overall average income. In line with previous
findings (cf. Armstrong, Lekezwa, and Siebrits 2008, van der Berg, Louw, and
Yu 2008, O¨zler 2007), the data reflects a high degree of inequality across sub-
groups.6 The kernel densities of total annual expenditures for Black, Coloured,
and White households in Figure A1 visualize the differences and skewness of the
respective distributions. In addition, the summary statistics show large differ-
ences in education levels. Most of the Black and Coloured household heads did
not finish secondary school, whereas this is not the case for White household
heads. Last, average household size differs significantly between White (three
members) and Black and Coloured households (four members).
As the household’s reference group will be defined on the basis of South
Africa’s provinces, some characteristics of the latter should also be noted. Since
1994, South Africa has consisted of nine rather heterogeneous provinces. They
differ in population size, average income, proportions of area type as well as the
composition of social groups. In 1995, almost two thirds of the Black population
lived in rural areas (Orkin 1997). Among the Coloured and White populations,
this is only true for 16 and 9 percent, respectively. Moreover, almost the entire
Coloured population lives mostly in two provinces (Western Cape & Northern
Cape), where it makes up the majority. White and Black populations can be
found in every province.7
In accordance with Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009), reference groups
are defined by social affiliation and regional proximity. Hence the assumption
6Note, furthermore, that the majority of the sample can be perceived as relatively poor.
More than 40 percent of the individuals within the sample live on less than the lower-bound
poverty line as defined by StatsSA (Yu 2008).
7Table A1 provides an overview of the populations distribution across provinces. A com-
parison of South African census estimates in 2001 (StatsSA 2009) and the figures of the pooled
sample show that the composition of social groups within and across the nine provinces is quite
accurately represented by the sample described in Table 1.
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is that Blacks (Coloureds, Whites) compare themselves only to other Blacks
(Coloureds, Whites). It is further assumed that these reference groups can be
defined at a provincial level. For the inference of one’s income in anonymous
interactions, it is thus necessary to know one’s social affiliation and place of
residence. Given the fact that most social interactions take place in the indi-
viduals residential environment, it is straightforward to assume that this kind
of knowledge is available to the observer. The arguably rough definition of ref-
erence groups is claimed to be justified by two reasons. Even after apartheid,
it has been recognized that race is still an important factor in social inter-
actions in South Africa. This has been shown in several areas like the labor
market, the education system as well as residential environments (see, e.g.,
Rospaba 2002, Moodley and Adam 2000). Further evidence is provided by a
representative survey of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, which shows
that levels of interracial contact remain low (IJR 2010). About one quarter of
the respondents report to have no verbal contacts with other groups in daily
life. Even more, about 50 percent, never socialize with individuals from different
groups. The second reason, which may justify the broad definition of reference
groups, is related to the goods considered. In contrast to luxuries such as big
TV sets or costly tableware, which are visible only to a narrow peer group,
this paper concentrates on conspicuous consumption goods that are portable
and easily observable in anonymous interactions (as defined in the first section
under the term visible consumption). Therefore it is claimed that a more nar-
rowly defined reference group would need much more specific assumptions and,
accordingly, also a different model.
The classification of what is perceived to be visible consumption is an empir-
ical task. For the U.S., Heffetz (2007) as well as Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov
(2009) conducted a survey for this purpose. Whereas the telephone survey con-
ducted by Heffetz (2007) was a random sample of the U.S. population over 18
years, the survey by Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) was made among
business students of the University of Chicago. According to the students’ opin-
ions, spending on apparel, accessories, such as watches and jewelry, personal
care, and vehicles, are the most visible signs of better economic circumstances
in anonymous interactions. In Heffetz’s survey, among the readily observable
goods, cigarettes, cars, clothing, and jewelry are ranked highest in terms of vis-
ibility. Thus, both surveys show quite similar results. For South Africa such a
survey is unfortunately not available. In this paper, a similar classification to
that for the U.S. is used. The visible consumption basket as defined by Charles,
Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) is not explicitly restricted to particular products.
Each item represents a category which may correspond to different products and
services in the U.S. and South Africa. However, spending on these categories
may still serve as a means to convey information about one’s status. Despite
other functional aspects served by these items, it would be hard to maintain
that goods which constitute outward appearance do not send any signals about
the economic status of a person in South Africa. It could, of course, be the case
that these signals are less important. If so, no systematic differences in spending
on the visible consumption basket should be found or explained by the signaling
status model.
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4 Empirical Investigation
This section starts out by assessing the differences in visible expenditures across
social groups. The following subsection tests the predictions of the signaling
model of status seeking outlined in section 2. Furthermore, the degrees of social
contingency are estimated.
4.1 Assessing the differences
To begin with, spending on visible consumption is compared across social groups.
Therefore log spending on the pooled basket of visible goods and services V isi
is regressed on group dummies indicating a household as being Black Bli or
Coloured Coli, the log of a household’s permanent income pInci, a vector of
demographic indicators Demi, i.e., area type, age, age squared, and family size
as well as a vector of year dummies Yri. The corresponding regression can be
formulated as follows:
ln(V isi) = β0 +β1 ∗Bli+β2 ∗Coli+γ ∗ ln(pInci)+δ ∗Demi + ∗Yri +εi. (1)
Permanent income is usually measured by total expenditure. In like cir-
cumstances, the measure is perceived as being more suitable than income as it
allows to account for realized total expenditures that are larger or lower than
actual income, making total expenditures a smoother measure of income. Note,
furthermore, that the log-log formulation of the regression equation allows to in-
terpret its coefficient γ as (permanent) income elasticity of visible consumption
expenditures. However, the permanent income measure does not come without
flaws. Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) point to the fact that total expen-
ditures are an endogenous variable to any components of total expenditures.
Measurement errors in these components may, moreover, translate into mea-
surement errors in the composite. Hence the log of total expenditures needs to
be instrumented. In a first approach, a set of instruments is applied, which is as
close as possible to the specification of Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009),
which, in turn, is a vector of current and permanent income controls. The set
contains a dummy for positive current income, log of current income, the level
of current income, a cubic in the level of current income as well as dummies for
three different levels of education (below secondary school, finished secondary
school, degree).8 In a second approach, the education variables are excluded
from the instruments. Since age and family size are assumed to directly in-
fluence spending on visible consumption, it appears to be straightforward to
assume that education might also directly influence the dependent variable.
Accordingly, the set of education variables is used as predictor variables in the
second approach. Tests of the statistical validity of different sets of instruments
suggest a specification with log of current income as a single instrument.9
In Table 2, the differences between White, Black, and Coloured households
are explored sequentially. Specification I estimates the unconditional differences
8To exactly match the authors specification, a series of one-digit industry and occupation
codes would also have to be included. This kind of data is unfortunately not available.
9Although F -stats and partial R2 on all instrument sets are sufficient, the large sample
demands cautiousness. In the second approach, the result of the weak identification test
exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values by far. This provides additional evidence
against weak-instrument concerns.
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Table 2: Differences in Log Visible Spending
Controls included Black Coloured
(I) No controls -1.53*** -0.99***
R2=0.10 (0.04) (0.05)
(II) Current income controls 0.06 0.11**
R2=0.34 (0.04) (0.04)
(III) Log total expenditure 0.56*** 0.41***
R2=0.47 (0.03) (0.03)
(IV) IV specifications 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.44*** 0.47***
R2=0.47 R2=0.47 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(V) Spez. IV plus time dummies 0.62*** 0.67*** 0.46*** 0.49***
R2=0.48 R2=0.48 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(VI) Spez. V plus demographics 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.33*** 0.35***
R2=0.49 R2=0.49 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Notes: The regressions use the full sample described in Table 1. Robust
standard errors, clustered at PSU level, are indicated in parentheses. ***
Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. *
Significant at the 5 percent level.
in spending on visible consumption without any controls. On average, White
households spend more on visible consumption than Black or Coloured house-
holds. These estimates comply with the first prediction of the signaling status
model. As White households are, on average, much more aﬄuent than Black
and Coloured households, they should spend a higher level of their income on
visible consumption. The introduction of current income variables in specifica-
tion II distinctively changes the results, i.e., both the sign and magnitude of
the coefficient change. The coefficients in specification III change further up-
wards after permanent income measure, log of total expenditure is introduced.
, Black and Coloured households spend about 56 respectively 41 percent more
on visible consumption than White households with comparable income. Note
further that the fit of the regression increases from R2 of 0.10 in specification
I to 0.47. Specification IV uses the instrumental variable approaches outlined
above. It offers two coefficients for each group, the first denoting the coefficient
of the former approach and the second denoting the coefficient of the latter.
Compared with the former specifications, the results change only slightly up-
wards. After year dummies are additionally included in specification V, the
coefficients increase again. Adding demographic controls in specification VI
corrects the figures downwards by about 12 percentage points. A comparison
of the two different instrumental variable approaches in specifications IV to VI
reveals only slight differences in coefficients. In the remainder of the paper, the
second approach is maintained.10
Although unreported in Table 2, demographic controls show significant ef-
fects. While age and education are found to decrease spending on visible con-
sumption, the coefficients for household size show positive signs. Only area type
does not yield any significant effect. The effect of education and age are found
to be comparatively large. Holding a degree as compared to having either com-
pleted secondary school or below secondary school education reduces the gap
in visible expenditures by about 50 percent. The same reduction in the visible
10While the second approach deviates from the specification by Charles, Hurst, and Rous-
sanov (2009), none of the results rely on the use of the second approach. Robustness checks
using the first approach show no qualitative changes in the coefficients of interest.
9
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spending gap can be found for households with heads older than 55 as compared
to younger than 35. Moreover, within the regression the coefficient for log total
expenditures γ is larger than one (1.32). As γ represents the income elasticity,
the visible consumption basket represents luxury goods and services.11 The
luxury property implies that with increasing income relatively more is spent on
visible consumption, which again confirms the first prediction of the signaling
model.
Overall, the first results in Table 2 indicate partial parallels to the findings in
the U.S., where the households of Black and Hispanic minorities spend 23 to 26
percent more on visible consumption than White households with comparable
income and demographic backgrounds. Similarly, a gap in visible consumption
spending can be found in South Africa, where Black households, which consti-
tute the majority of the overall population, spend about 50 percent more on
visible consumption than their White counterparts. These figures are substan-
tial in absolute terms. Given that average spending of White households on
visible consumption is about 21,932 Rand a year (see Table A3), the above re-
sult implies that comparable Black households, on average, spend 10,966 Rand
more on visible consumption per year.
A closer examination of visible consumption components reveals a fairly
consistent picture (see panel A in Table A4). Although the coefficients for
particular components differ in size, they uniformly show positive differences.
A negative coefficient can only be found for cars.12 However, its magnitude is
negligible. The same pattern holds if only car owners are considered (panel B
of Table A4). Overall, the differences are most pronounced for clothing and
footwear , followed by jewelry and personal care.
When Black and Coloured households spend relatively more on visible con-
sumption than comparable White households, they have to spend less on other
product categories. This relationship is further explored in Table 3, which shows
differences in log spending on all other product categories.13 The categories are
chosen according to the broad categories reported by the IESs. After excluding
visible consumption goods and merging the categories restaurants & hotels and
recreation & culture, results for the remaining ten categories are reported in Ta-
ble 3. In line with the findings of Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009), most
of the coefficients show negative signs. More specifically, Black and Coloured
households spend less on health & medical services, housing & utilities, recre-
ation & culture/ restaurants & hotels, and communication. Only the coefficients
for food and miscellaneous goods & services are consistently and significantly
positive for Black and Coloured households. Although it might be tempting to
emphasize the positive difference in spending on education for Black households,
the reader is advised to be cautious in this respect for two reasons. While it
is possible to control for household size, the data does not allow to properly
control for the number of children within the household. Moreover, education is
the only expenditure category which reports a much higher rate of zero values
11Note that this is not true for each of the product categories alone. At least cars and
jewelry show γ values lower than one for Black and Coloured households. However, as can
be seen in Table A2, the percentage of households with positive spending in these categories
does not exceed 20 percent of the overall sample.
12Note that Black households which are car owners constitute less than two percent of the
Black sample.
13A more detailed composition of the consumption categories can be found in Table A5.
10
 #1003 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Differences in Log Expenditure Categories
Expenditure category Black Coloured
Alcohol & tobaccoT -1.44*** 0.39***
(0.08) (0.08)
CommunicationT -0.84*** -1.17***
(0.08) (0.07)
EducationT 0.60*** -0.13
(0.06) (0.07)
Food 0.10*** 0.21***
(0.03) (0.03)
Furnishings & household equipment 0.40*** 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Health & medical servicesT -0.61*** -0.85***
(0.07) (0.07)
Housing & utilities -0.73*** -0.24***
(0.05) (0.05)
Miscellaneous goods & servicesT 0.94*** 0.90***
(0.07) (0.08)
Recreation & culture/ restaurants & hotelsT -0.14* -0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
Transportation 0.75*** -0.35***
(0.07) (0.08)
Notes: The specification of the regressions is similar to specification IV
of Table 2. Only categories which are labeled withT are estimated using
Tobit regressions due to a nontrivial fraction of zeros. Coefficients then
denote marginal effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at PSU level,
are indicated in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **
Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.
for White households as compared to remaining households in the sample (see
Table A3).
4.2 Explaining the differences
In this subsection, it is tested whether the differences in spending on visible
consumption can be explained by the signaling model outlined in section 2.
The second prediction, If average group income rises, spending on conspicuous
consumption decreases, is of special interest here because it incorporates the
group’s income distribution as a socially contingent factor explaining the level
of visible consumption. Among comparable households, which differ only with
respect to their mean group income, those living in a more aﬄuent environment
have a relatively less favorable position within their reference group and should
therefore spend relatively less on visible consumption. To maintain the under-
lying assumption of similar utility functions across groups, this should be true
not only across social groups but also within each group. Moreover, the results
of the second prediction are explored in more detail to disentangle the socially
contingent and the autonomous shares of visible consumption.
To test the second prediction, the following regression is estimated separately
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Table 4: Within-Group Differences in Log Visible Expenditures
Controls (I) (II)
Log mean group income (Black) -0.26***
(0.06)
Log mean group income (White) 0.10
(0.13)
Notes: The regressions use the full sample described in Ta-
ble 1. Specifications I and II are similar to specification VI
in Table 1 except for the omission of group dummies and the
introduction of log mean own group income. Specifications I
and II are estimated separately by subgroups. Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered at PSU level, are indicated in paren-
theses. *** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.
for Black and White households:14
ln(V isi) = β0 + α ∗ ln(Incµk,t) + γ ∗ ln(pInci) + δ ∗Demi +  ∗Yri + ζi, (2)
where k refers to one of 27 provinces/race units and Incµk,t denotes the average
income of a certain group in one of the nine provinces in a certain year.
The results in Table 4 confirm the second prediction only partially. The
negative coefficient in specification I of Table 4 complies with the prediction.
Its value of -0.26 implies that if mean group income doubles, the expenditures on
visible consumption decrease by 26 percent. Thus, on average, about one quarter
of the expenditures on the visible consumption basket turns out to be socially
contingent. The same coefficient estimated for White households (specification
II) does not comply with the second prediction as it fails to show any significant
negative effect. Accordingly, the conjecture that, independent of social group
affiliation, spending on visible consumption is a general means to signal status
cannot be confirmed. The results thus challenge the assumption of similar utility
functions. However, this is not to deny any social contingency among White
households. Two explanations may apply here. Either for historical reasons
Whites do have no need to signal status at all, or they simply use different means
to signal their relative position within their reference group. Both explanations
would be in line with Mason (1998), who acknowledges different status-related
behavior between old-established wealthy individuals and those whose income
has increased only recently.
Thus far, the results confirm the social contingency hypothesis at least for
Blacks, who make up the largest share of the South African population. How-
ever, although such an effect could be found on average, it is unclear whether
its magnitude is evenly distributed. In fact, one could argue that the magnitude
may be more pronounced among the poorest households. This would amount to
claiming that relatively poor households are more inclined to care about status
which would, in turn, translate into higher socially contingent shares of visi-
ble consumption. It is thus explored whether the former effect systematically
changes across the income distribution of the Black population. Using the par-
titioning approach (see, e.g., Yip and Tsang 2007), regression (2) is rerun with
14A separate regression for Coloured households is omitted as the skewed distribution of
Coloureds across provinces (see Table A1) does not allow to obtain reliable estimates of mean
group income for most provinces.
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Figure 1: Social Contingency in Visible Consumption Expenditures
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Notes: The upper and lower lines denote the 95 percent confidence
interval of the estimated effect (middle line) of mean group income
on visible consumption for different deciles of Black households per-
manent income.
interaction terms connecting mean reference group income, and ten mutually
exclusive and exhaustive decile dummies, indicating the households position in
the permanent income distribution. More accurately, the coefficient of mean ref-
erence group income (-0.26) is partitioned across ten permanent income decile
dummies.15 The partitioned coefficients are shown in Figure 1. On the x-axis,
the chart depicts permanent income in ten deciles. The y-axis depicts the effect
of mean reference group income on visible consumption expenditures. The solid
line connects the ten separate coefficients. Except for the two poorest deciles,
the estimates are highly significant. It is obvious from Figure 1 that the mag-
nitude of the coefficients, which can be read as the socially contingent shares of
visible consumption, increases with income. If, ceteris paribus, mean reference
group income doubles, wealthy households reduce spending on visible consump-
tion more than twice as much as households in the 5th decile. In contrast to
the hypothetical claim above, Figure 1 supports the opposite. In fact, the co-
efficient for the poorest deciles is small and insignificant. The results indicate
that the autonomous share of visible consumption decreases with income, while
the socially contingent share increases. This finding is in line with theoretical
predictions as well as empirical findings of the subjective well-being literature,
which hypothesizes that positional concerns are positively correlated with ab-
solute levels of income (of a country) (Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008, Akay,
Martinsson, and Medhin 2009). Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that in
the case of Black South Africans, the desire for status, and hence for recognition,
increases with income.
Overall, the finding described in the previous paragraph makes an even
15To straightforwardly interpret the results, mean reference group income has to be omitted
from the right-hand side of regression (2).
13
 #1003 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Differences in Log Visible Expenditures
Controls (I) (II)
Black dummy 0.54*** 0.08
(0.04) (0.09)
Coloured dummy 0.35*** 0.01
(0.04) (0.06)
Log mean own group income -0.29***
(0.05)
Notes: The regressions use the full sample described in Ta-
ble 1. Specification I is similar to specification VI in Table 2.
Specification II additionally includes the log of mean reference
group income. Robust standard errors, clustered at PSU level,
are indicated in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.1 percent
level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the
5 percent level.
stronger case for the suitability of the signaling status model in tracing so-
cial contingencies in consumption expenditures. Although the socially contin-
gent share in visible consumption increases with income, the different incen-
tives to consume conspicuously seem to explain that, at every level of income,
Black households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable
White households.
To complete the analysis, one remaining implication of the signaling status
model is tested. If concerns for status determine spending on visible consump-
tion, the differences in spending should vanish, or at least diminish, after the
reference group’s average income is controlled for. Table 5 contrasts the results
of specification VI in Table 2 with results of a similar regression that includes
mean reference group income as an additional control variable. The group vari-
ables in the second specifications show a striking difference. The coefficient for
Coloured as well as for Black households drops sharply and loses significance.
Moreover, the coefficient of mean reference group income is clearly significant
and negative.16 Concerns for status thus appear to be an important factor in
explaining differential spending on visible consumption across social groups.
5 Conclusion
South African society is characterized by huge differences within and between
social groups. This paper examines only a very small part of these differences,
namely those in the spending on a particular consumption category by social
groups. It is shown that Coloureds and Blacks spend between 30 to 50 percent
more on a basket of visible consumption goods and services than comparable
Whites. This finding is especially enlightening because the partly socially con-
tingent expenditures on visible consumption among Black and Coloured house-
holds, which are on average much less aﬄuent than White ones, imply lower
spending on other consumption categories. Regarding the data under consider-
ation, lower expenditures on health & medical services are the most remarkable.
In the empirical analysis, it is tested whether the differences in spending on
16Robustness checks reveal that no alternative measure of reference group income, such
as the overall province average or the provincial mean of a certain group alone, is able to
invalidate the group dummies.
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visible consumption can be explained by a signaling model that incorporates so-
cially contingent concerns for status. Under the assumption that status-related
expenditures depend on the relative position within the own reference group,
the influence of mean reference group income on group differences in visible
spending is tested. In line with the predictions of the signaling model, the ref-
erence group’s mean income is found to account for these differences. Having
a more favorable position within the own reference group, i.e., having a less
aﬄuent reference group than comparable households, may thus explain higher
visible spending of Black and Coloured households.
Counter to the model’s assumptions, differential spending on visible con-
sumption cannot be confirmed for each group separately. Although the expec-
tations are confirmed for the largest share of the population, socially contingent
spending on visible consumption is not observable within the White population.
This indicates that among White South Africans, visible consumption appears
to be a less viable sign of their economic position. However, this finding does
not deny any social contingency among White South Africans. Most probably it
is only the signaling channels that differ from those of U.S. Americans or Black
South Africans. Nevertheless, the different results for South African subpop-
ulations point to the fact that different groups may develop different ways to
express their relative position within a society. Therefore it may not always be
justified to assume similar utility functions across different groups.
Moreover, the paper has assessed whether the importance of status consider-
ations changes with income. As spending on visible consumption is found to be
a rather poor proxy to capture status-related consumption among Whites, the
analysis is restricted to the Black subpopulation. With rising income, a higher
share of visible consumption expenditures is found to be socially contingent.
This finding indicates steady differences in the importance of status, and there-
fore the desire for recognition with rising income. The overall results confirm
the importance of Veblen’s concept of socially contingent status considerations
in an economically emerging country.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Population Statistics in South African Provinces
Population share Share Black Share Coloured Share White
Eastern Cape 0.14 0.88/0.84 0.07/0.07 0.05/0.09
Free State 0.06 0.88/0.81 0.03/0.03 0.09/0.16
Gauteng 0.20 0.74/0.71 0.04/0.03 0.20/0.26
KwaZulu-Natal 0.21 0.85/0.87 0.02/0.02 0.05/0.10
Limpopo 0.12 0.97/0.97 0.00/0.00 0.02/0.03
Mpumalanga 0.07 0.92/0.89 0.01/0.01 0.07/0.11
Northern Cape 0.02 0.36/0.41 0.52/0.42 0.12/0.17
North West 0.08 0.92/0.88 0.02/0.02 0.07/0.10
Western Cape 0.10 0.27/0.24 0.54/0.47 0.18/0.30
National 1 0.79/0.76 0.09/0.08 0.10/0.15
Notes: The figures before the slash denote official 2001 census numbers (StatsSA
2009). The figures after the slash refer to survey weighted statistics form the
pooled sample described in Table 1.
Table A2: Visible Consumption Summary Statistics by Subgroups
Subcategory All Black Coloured White
Personal care 1,172 807 1,326 2,907
0.87 0.86 0.92 0.93
0.036 0.037 0.036 0.029
Apparel (incl. footwear) 2,469 2,031 2,895 4,420
0.89 0.88 0.90 0.92
0.076 0.084 0.069 0.038
Jewelry 114 59 107 395
0.20 0.19 0.18 0.26
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
Cars 2,662 461 1,621 14,210
0.05 0.02 0.06 0.22
0.015 0.006 0.015 0.060
Sample 72,163 54,164 8,916 9,083
Notes: In the first row of each expenditure category, the table
shows survey weighted mean consumption levels in 2005 South
African Rand. The second line depicts the share of households
with positive spending in the respective categories. The expen-
diture shares are given in the third row.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics of Expenditure Categories by Subgroups
Expenditure category All Black Coloured White
Visible consumption 6,417 3,357 5,949 21,932
0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
0.128 0.129 0.122 0.129
Alcohol & tobacco 850 525 1,405 2,170
0.47 0.41 0.68 0.62
0.027 0.027 0.042 0.022
Communication 1,471 655 1,540 5,499
0.69 0.65 0.67 0.93
0.028 0.023 0.031 0.048
Education 957 541 712 3,162
0.50 0.53 0.49 0.35
0.017 0.016 0.013 0.023
Food 9,373 3,831 6,144 8,720
1 0.99 1 1
0.357 0.390 0.364 0.189
Furnishings & household equipment 3,544 2,251 2,823 10,386
0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
0.078 0.078 0.063 0.081
Health & medical services 1,940 699 1,580 8,327
0.73 0.69 0.75 0.93
0.028 0.020 0.025 0.067
Housing & utilities 5,131 2,625 6,052 17,129
0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99
0.135 0.123 0.169 0.179
Miscellaneous goods & services 4,273 2,475 3,279 13,779
0.76 0.72 0.83 0.95
0.074 0.072 0.063 0.094
Recreation & culture/ restaurants & hotels 2,896 1,294 2,469 11,118
0.79 0.74 0.84 0.98
0.051 0.046 0.047 0.080
Transportation 3,518 2,137 3,243 10,553
0.85 0.84 0.77 0.93
0.076 0.075 0.061 0.088
Sample 72,163 54,164 8,916 9,083
Notes: In the first row of each expenditure category, the table shows survey
weighted mean consumption levels in 2005 South African Rand. The second line
depicts the share of households with positive spending in the respective categories.
The expenditure shares are given in the third row.
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Table A4: Differences in Log Spending on Visible Consumption by Subcategories
Visible consumption A: Full sample B: Automobile owners (#3292)
subcategory Black Coloured Black (#961) Coloured (#453)
Personal care 0.22** 0.33** 0.10 0.51**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.17)
Clothing 1.46*** 1.01*** 0.56 0.56*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.36) (0.25)
Footwear 1.48*** 1.11*** 0.26 0.25
(0.08) (0.09) (0.40) (0.31)
JewelryT 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.95*** 0.27
(0.03) (0.06) (0.27) (0.25)
CarsT -0.02*** 0.001 -0.02 0.01
(0.005) (0.004) (0.10) (0.13)
Apparel incl. jewelry 1.41*** 0.94*** 0.55* 0.46*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.26) (0.21)
Notes: The specification of the regressions is similar to specification VI of Table 2.
Only categories which are labeled withT are estimated using Tobit regressions due to a
nontrivial fraction of zeros. Coefficients then denote marginal effects. Panel A consists
of the whole sample. Panel B is restricted to households with positive spending on
the purchase of new or used cars. As Tobit regression naturally cannot be run for cars
in panel B, the coefficients denote OLS results. Robust standard errors, clustered at
PSU level, are indicated in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **
Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A5: Expenditure Categories
Expenditure category Description
Visible consumption Personal care (hairdressing, appliances & products)
Jewelry (jewelry, clocks, and watches)
Clothing & footwear (incl. related services)
Cars (new and used cars excl. maintenance)
Alcohol & tobacco Spirits, wine, beer, tobacco
Communication Postal services, telephone & fax
Education Expenses on primary, secondary, tertiary, and other education
Food All kinds of food and nonalcoholic beverages consumed at home
Furnishings & household equipment Furnishings, carpets, electrical appliances, glass/tableware,
maintenance of dwelling, related services
Health & medical services Pharmaceutical & therapeutical products/equipment; medical &
dental services, health insurance, medical aid subscriptions
Housing & utilities Rentals, electricity, water, gas, other fuels, sewerage
Miscellaneous goods & services Insurances (excl. health), social protection services, financial
services, other unspecified expenditures
Recreation & culture Recreation equipment & services, cultural services, holidays
Restaurants & hotels Beverages, meals, accommodation
Transportation Services by air, rail, road, waterways; car maintenance
Notes: The expenditure categories are defined according to the broadest categories used in the IES.
There are two exceptions to this rule. First, visible consumption goods are excluded from the former cat-
egory to rule out double counting. Second, expenses on health insurance and medical aid subscriptions
are reallocated from miscellaneous goods & services to health and medical services.
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  Figure A1: Kernel Densities of Annual Total Expenditures
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Notes: The samples used are the same as described in Table 1. To
preserve clarity, the sample of White households is restricted to its
95th percentile. Amounts are given in 2005 South African Rand.
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